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THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND PARTICULAR
KINDS OF PROPERTY
Carlton B. Schnell
Because of the limitations and restrictions imposed by section 2056
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code,' it is incumbent upon the drafts-
man to pay particular attention to the specific assets which may be a
part of a decedent's estate and to rights which his spouse may have
under local law. Some of the problems in connection with particular
kinds of property and property rights have been considered previously
by commentators;' however, recent developments in many of these areas
make a review appropriate. Also, this article will discuss problems raised
by foreign property and property constituting income with respect to a
decedent under section 691.3
INTERESTS AND RIGHTS ARISING UNDER STATE LAW
Under the laws of most states, a widow is given a number of rights
or interests in property which can materially affect the marital deduction.
Among these are support allowance, property exempt from administra-
tion, dower and homestead rights, and the right to elect to take an interest
under the statute of descent and distribution, rather than under the will.
Widow's Allowance
Generally, a widow's allowance constitutes an award paid to the
spouse for her support during a limited period of time after her husband's
death. The regulations provide that such an award constitutes a
property interest passing from the decedent to his spouse for purposes of
section 2056.' The same regulation, however, takes the position that
the terminable interest rules are applicable. The application of the
terminable interest rules to the widow's allowance has been the subject
of extensive litigation,5 and as a result of a conflict between circuit courts of
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited as CODE §].
2. Bush, Widow's Exemptoon or Allowamce and the Marital Deductwn, N.Y.U. 22D INST.
ON FED. TAX 1131 (1964); Stevens, Fourteen Years of Marital Deduction, N.Y.U. 21ST
INST. ON FED. TAX 257 (1963)
3. CODE § 691.
4. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg. §].
5. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961); Estate of
Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961);
Estate of William A. Landers, Sr., 38 T.C. 828 (1962), Estate of Michael G. Rudnick, 36
T.C. 1021 (1961); Estate of Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960); Estate of Proctor D.
Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
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appeals,6 the issue was presented to the United States Supreme Court for
the first time in 1964.' The case of Jackson v. United States8 involved
an award made to a widow under California law The decedent died
on May 27, 1951, and on June 30, 1952, the state court allowed the
widow, a sum of $3,000 per month for her support for a period of 24
months beginning as of the date of the decedent's death. Under the
terms of the order an allowance of $42,000 had accrued during the four-
teen months from the time of death to the date of the order. The court
awarded an additional $3,000 a month for the remainder of the two-year
period, making a total of $72,000 which was in fact paid by the estate
to the widow. California law was evidently clear that nothing accrued
to the widow until the order granting the allowance. Thus, if the widow
were to die or remarry prior to securing an order, the right would not
survive. The court found that under these facts the widow did not have
an indefeasible interest in the property at the moment of her husband's
death. The taxpayer argued that the terminability be adjudged as of the
date of the probate court order rather than the date of death. This was
the effect of a number of prior lower court decisions.' The Court said
that this construction was not within the meaning and spirit of the statute.
The petitioners in Jackson also argued that the purpose of the ter-
minable interest provision was to assure that interests deducted from the
estate of the deceased spouse would not also escape taxation in the estate
of the survivor, and since, under the facts there, the entire $72,000
would be taxed to the widow's estate, it should not be included in her
husband's estate. The Court answered that the determinative factor was
not the taxability to the surviving spouse, but the termmability as de-
fined in the statute; it was the Court's opinion that these provisions might
be imperfect devices to achieve the desired end, but that they were the
means which Congress had chosen. Justice White, speaking for the
Court, added a bit of philosophy which should be taken to heart by all
draftsmen.
The achievement of the purposes of the marital deduction is depen-
dent to a great degree upon the careful drafting of wills; we have no
fear that our decision today will prevent either the full utilization of
the marital deduction or the proper support of widows during the
pendency of an estate proceeding.10
6. Compare the decision of the mnth circuit in Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, supra note
5, with the decision in the fifth circuit in United States v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. supra
note 5.
7. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
8. Ibu.
9. United States v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961); Estate of
Michael G. Rudnick, 36 T.C. 1021 (1961); Estate of Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960).
10. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 511 (1964).
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The author does not have the same confidence that Justice White has
regarding the effect of the Jackson decision. It is submitted that practi-
tioners in many states will not be able to clearly determine whether
the allowance does or does not, under current local law, qualify for the
marital deduction. But if they are fortunate enough to be able to
make a clear determination, and if they determine that the allowance will
not qualify, then there is great difficulty in achieving the maximum
marital deduction where a formula approach is used in connection with
a trust." It is not possible under such circumstances to treat an amount
paid the widow as an allowance as an advance of the gift made to her
under the will. Although it may be possible in some states to provide
that the interest given the spouse under the will is in lieu of all rights
under state law, this may not always be practical.
After Jackson, the sole question to be answered is whether the
widow's allowance under state law is a right vested in her as of the tune
of death and one which will survive either her death or her remarriage
during the period of the allowance. Prior to Jackson, the Government
had acquiesced in a number of Tax Court decisions permitting the
widow's allowance in, among other states, Michigan, 2 Maine, 3 and
Massachusetts. 4 Since Jackson, the Government has withdrawn these
prior acqutescences and substituted a non-acquescence in each case."5
Also, in a fifth circuit decision after Jackson, that circuit reversed its
prior ruling, holding that under Georgia law the widow's allowance is
a terminable interest."6
In Ohio, there has never been, to the author's knowledge, any ques-
tion raised about the widow's allowance qualifying for the marital
deducton; nor should that result be changed by the Jackson decision. In
a 1951 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court clearly held that the right of
a widow to a year's allowance vests immediately upon the spouse's death
and becomes a preferred and secured debt of the estate. Even though
the widow dies within the period of twelve months after the death of her
husband and such allowance has not been set off during her lifetime, the
allowance must nevertheless be awarded, fixed, and determined on the
11. The effect of Jackson is that the marital gift is "overqualified," f.e., too much property
passes to the widow and the resulting estate tax on her estate is increased. If the gift to the
widow is outright, the problem could be avoided by providing that any allowance paid to the
spouse would be treated as an advance of a portion of her gift.
12. Estate of Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 31 T.C. 818 (1959), acq., 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 5,
nonacq., 1964 INT. REv. BULL No. 32, at 7
13. Estate of Margaret R. Gale, 35 T.C. 215 (1960) acq., 1962-2 CUM. BULL, 4, nonacq.,
1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 32, at 7
14. Estate of Michael G. Rudnick, 36 T.C. 1021 (1961) acq., 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 4, non-
acq., 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 32, at 7
15. 1964 INT. REV. BULL No. 32, at 7
16. United States v. Edmondson, 331 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1964)
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basis of her reasonable support for twelve months and this survives as
an asset of her estate.' Neither the Tax Court nor a federal district
court has passed upon the question of the widow's allowance in Oho.8
Property Exempt From Admzntstratzon
The Commissioner has ruled that property set off as exempt from
administration under state law qualifies as having passed from the de-
cedent to the spouse, and will be treated as an inheritance which qualifies
for the marital deduction."9 Ohuo property appears to come within this
ruling. There has been no litigation with respect to such property quali-
fying as there has with the widow's allowance. However, one caution is
necessary- the terminable interest rules are applicable, and if local law
gives the minor children some type of survivorship right in such property,
it may not qualify. In Ohio, minor children do have such a survivorship
right in property set off in something other than money ° For that
reason, it may be advisable to have the widow select cash rather than
specific property.
Dower and Homestead Rights
Common law dower is generally considered to be a terminable in-
terest and therefore the dower right as such would dearly not qualify
for the marital deduction.2 ' However, most states that have retained
common law dower have adopted statutory provisions giving the widow
the right to elect to take a commutation of her dower interest where the
court finds that the dower interest may not be conveniently laid off and
assigned in kind. The result is that after such order, the property is
sold and the widow is paid in cash from the proceeds of the sale. It
has been the Commissioner's contention that such proceeds, representing
only a conversion of the dower interest, do not qualify for the marital
deduction. It might be expected that the result here would be similar
to the result in the widow's allowance cases, but surprisingly enough this
17. In re Estate of Croke, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 483 (1951); accord, In re Estate
of Wreede, 106 Ohio App. 324, 154 N.E.2d 756 (1958)
18. An advance of funds by the widow herself to the estate in order to pay debts, including
the allowance, will defeat the deductibility of the allowance since it is not paid by the estate.
Estate of John H. Denman, 33 T.C. 361 (1959), afj'd, 287 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1961). If
the widow elects to purchase property at its appraised value under Ohio Revised Code §
2113.38, the property will nevertheless be valued, where the alternate valuation is elected, as
of the date of sale and a marital deduction will not be allowed for the difference between the
values represented by market appreciation. Estate of Walter 0. Critchfield, 32 T.C. 844
(1959). Neither of these cases, however, directly involved a determination on the deducti-
bility of the widow's allowance itself.
19. Rev. Rul. 55-419, 1955-1 CUM. BUtLL 458.
20. Oio REv. CODE 5 2115.13.
21. Rev. Rul. 279, 1953-2 CuM. BuLL. 275.
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has not been true. Although the issue has not as yet been presented
to the Supreme Court, a number of circuit courts have seemingly applied
a different test than that applied in the widow's allowance cases, holding
that in effect the widow's right to dower is not a vested life estate until
it is laid off and assigned to her.22 The result is that when a federal court
is faced with a state court finding that the interest was not susceptible
of assignment, it holds that the interest which the widow has was never
a life estate, but only a right to the commuted value of dower.
It might have been expected that after the Jackson decision, the
trend in the dower cases would be reversed. However, in the one case
decided since Jackson, which the Government relied on heavily, the court
distinguished the situations by stating that the dower right is one vested
as of the date of the decedent's death, whereas the right to a widow's al-
lowance does not become a vested right until the order is made granting
it to the widow 2  It is submitted that the dower right is no more "vested"
in states where that right exists than is the right to the widow's allowance.
If the widow dies before an order is entered finding that the dower inter-
est cannot be assigned to her, it is usually held that her estate does not
retain any asset referable to that interest.24 For that reason, it may very
well be that the result in the dower cases will be overturned when that
issue reaches the Supreme Court.
Election to Take Against the Will
The regulations state that any property taken by the widow under a
statute giving her the right to elect against the will and take her intestate
share in lieu thereof qualifies as having passed from the decedent to
the spouse.25  If the possibilities of the marital deduction were not ade-
quately considered at the time the will was prepared, it may be possible
to save a substantial amount of federal estate tax and still achieve the
testator's desires by counseling the widow to elect against the will.2" In
so doing, however, it is necessary to keep in mind the applicable state
law rules governing apportionment of taxes in such a situation.27
In order for the interest passing to the spouse under the election to
qualify for the marital deduction, the spouse must in fact make a valid
election, and the interest must pass to her by virtue of having so made
22. Dougherty v. United States, 292 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Crosby,
257 F.2d 515 (5th Cit. 1958); United States v. Traders Natl Bank, 248 F.2d 667 (8th Cit.
1957).
23. First Nat'i Exch. Bank v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12253 (4th Cir. 1964)
24. Cf. 28 C.J.S. Dower § 71 (1941), and cases cited therein.
25. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(c) (1958).
26. See Estate of Jaeger v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1958), affirming, 27 T.C.
863 (1957).
27 Edwards, Marital Deduction Pitfalls - Methods of Losing the Marital Deduction, 16 W
REs. L. REV. 253 (1965).
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an election.28 Payments made by other beneficiaries in order to forestall
the election may not qualify as having passed from the surviving spouse
for purposes of section 2056.29 In one case, the widow received only
a life estate under her deceased husband's will, and the trustees of his
estate were given discretion to make payments of principal to the widow.
In order to forestall the election, which would have forced the estate to
dispose of some closely-held stock, the trustees entered into an agreement
which the court held to be binding on them to exercise their discretion
to pay her principal. The court found that what the widow took was
still a terminable interest.80
Amounts Arising out of Will Controversies
An amount which is paid or transferred to the widow as a result of a
controversy involving her interest in the estate, as an heir, is deemed to
have passed to the widow and therefore qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion if the transfer was m bona fide recognition of an enforceable right.
This determination must, of course, be made by the Tax Court or federal
district court under applicable state law. This is a result of the Jackson
case which held that courts must inquire into a widow's rights under state
law in a widow's allowance situation. Assuming that a court is fortunate
enough to find some state law authorities on the question, there still re-
mains some doubt as to the binding effect of such authority for federal
tax purposes."' In many other situations there will be no applicable state
law at all.
Although the Commissioner has generally required that the enforce-
able right must have arisen out of an adversary proceeding, 2 the courts
have been more lenient and have permitted the deduction where the
amount was paid as a result of an "arm's-length" settlement.3 It is diffi-
cult to harmonize those decisions with decisions such as Estate of Hyman
Kleinman4 and Estate of Charles ElsonW5 which involved payments made
to forestall an election under the will. It is submitted that the Supreme
Court's rejection of the "intent of Congress" argument in the Jackson
case may affect the results in this area as well.
28. Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957); Estate of Hyman Kleinman, 25 T.C. 1245
(1956), affd per curtam, 245 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957)
29. Estate of Hyman Kleiman, supra note 28.
30. Ibul.
31. Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957); Teschner, State Court Decistons, Federal
Taxation, and the Commtsstoner's Wonderland: The Need for Prelimsnary Charactertzation,
41 TAXES 98 (1963), and cases cited therein.
32. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (2) (1958).
33. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Umted States, 191 F. Supp.
73 (S.D. Ind. 1961); Estate of Gertrude P. Barrett, 22 T.C. 606 (1954).
34. 25 T.C. 1245 (1956), afid per curtain, 245 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957).
35. 28 T.C. 442 (1957).
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JOINTLY-OWNED PROPERTY
Property owned jointly by the decedent and his wife will normally
qualify for the marital deducton. 6 However, it is important to distin-
guish between jointly-owned property and property which the decedent
devises or bequeaths to his spouse and another as joint tenants. In the
latter case, the devise of such property will not qualify because it is by
its very nature a terminable interest.
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO ENCUMBRANCE
Where the property which is devised or bequeathed to the spouse is
subject to an encumbrance, such as a mortgage, the value of the marital
bequest is reduced accordingly 37 Although this rule is clear, there may
be some difficulty in applying it. For example, in Estate of D Byrd
Gwnn"8 the decedent pledged a policy of insurance as collateral security
for a personal loan. Upon his death, the insurance proceeds were pay-
able to his wife as beneficiary, but subject of course to any unpaid amount
of the loan. The decedent's indebtedness to the insurance company was
in fact paid by the estate and the estate claimed the full marital deduc-
tion for the insurance proceeds delivered to the wife. The estate's
position was upheld against the Commissioner's objections that the value
of the proceeds should be reduced by the amount of the debt.
Another problem area with respect to the gift or bequest of property
subject to an encumbrance is that of foreign property which will be
subject to foreign death taxes. This has become an area of added im-
portance in estate planning since foreign real estate has been only recently
included in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.3" The be-
quest of such property to the spouse can result in the loss of all or a por-
tion of the foreign death tax credit. This result occurs because of a
limitation on the foreign death tax credit.40  Section 20.2014-3 of the
regulations spells out in detail the procedure and the steps necessary
to calculate the credit where a marital bequest of foreign property is
involved. The effect of the computations is that in applying the limitmg
fraction to the federal estate tax, both the numerator and the denomina-
tor of that fraction are reduced by any property which qualifies for the
marital deduction. If the property bequeathed to the spouse is the only
property subject to foreign death taxes, the elimination of such bequest
from both the numerator and denominator results in the limitation
36. CODE § 2056(e) (5)
37 CODE § 2056(b) (4) (B).
38. 25 T.C. 31 (1955)
39. CODE § 2031 was amended with respect to the estates of decedents dying after October
16, 1962. to delete the prior exclusion of foreign real estate.
40. CODE § 2014(b) (2)
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becoming zero, and the foreign death tax credit is lost entirely. It is
desirable, therefore, to qualify the marital bequest by specifically exclud-
ing property which may be subject to a foreign, tax credit. Although
there are many forms of doing this, the following language should prove
satisfactory- The gift to, my wife herein shall not be satisfied by the
distribution to her -of assets with respect to which a foreign death tax
credit is allowable under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
THE MAmTAL DEDUCTION A SECTION 691 '
Section 691 (c) permits the estate or the .beneficiary of the estate,
depending upon who in fact receives the property, to take a deduction
for income tax purposes for that portion of the estate tax resulting from
the inclusion of section 691 property in the gross estate. Section 691
property is generally income which the decedent earned or had a right to
during his lifetime, but which was in fact not received until after his
death. In order to determine the advisability of including such property
in the marital bequest, careful estate planning is required with attention
to a comparison of the relative burdens of the income and estate tax.
The argument has been advanced that where a portion of the in-
come in respect of a decedent passes to the surviving spouse, and the
part of the income which qualifies for the marital deduction does not
exceed fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate, the section 691 property
must be eliminated from both the gross estate and the marital deduction
in making the computation of the estate tax, with the income in respect
of a decedent eliminated - the so-called "second computation." The ef-
fect of this is that there would be no change in the estate tax and there-
fore no income tax deduction under section 691 (c) 41 There are no regu-
lations or rulings on this question and the Commissioner was unsuccessful
in the only reported case on the question.42 However, the issue has not
been foreclosed, and where such income may be significant, it may be
advisable to consider eliminating it from the marital bequest.
Another aspect of the section 691 problem in connection with the
marital deduction is present in almost every estate where a self-adjusting
formula is used. The elimination of each dollar of income in respect
of a decedent, when making the second computation of the estate tax to
determine the section 691 (c) deduction, results M a reduction of one
dollar in the adjusted gross estate, but reduces the marital deduction by
only fifty cents, so that the estate tax attributable to the elimination
would be only half of what might otherwise be expected. If, on the
other hand, such income is bequeathed to someone other than the spouse
41. 2 LAssm, EsrATE TAX TCHNmiQuEs, 2058 (1961). See also Findlay v. Commissioner,
64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9532 (2d Cir. 1964).
42. Estate of Thomas A. Desmond, 13 C.C.H. Tax Ct Mem. 889 (1954).
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and if that which qualifies for the marital deduction does not exceed
fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate, then the marital deduction for
estate tax does not reduce the section 691 (c) deduction. It may even
be advisable in certain cases to forego the maximum marital deduction
in order to increase the section 691 (c) deduction. This would be true
where the section 691 property is substantial and where the recipient's
income tax bracket is materially higher than the federal estate tax bracket
of the estate. For example, assume an adjusted gross estate of $1,000,-
000 with $300,000 of section 691 income:
(a) If the Maximum Marital Deduction Formula Clause is Used.
Adjusted gross estate --------------------- $1,000,000
Marital deduction ------------------------- 500,000
Taxable estate ---------------------------- 500,000
Tax ------------------------------------ 126,500
Second computation:
Adjusted gross estate ---------------------- 700,000
Marital deduction ------------------------- 350,000
Taxable estate ---------------------------- 350,000
Tax ------------------------------------ 78,500
Section 691(c) deduction: ($126,500- $78,500) $ 48,000
(or 2 of tax rate of 32% x $300,000)
(b) If Wife Gets $250,000, but None of § 691 Property:
Adjusted gross estate --------------------- $1,000,000
Marital deduction ------------------------- 250,000
Taxable estate --------------------------- 750,000
Tax ------------------------------------ 212,200
Second computation:
Adjusted gross estate ---------------------- $ 700,000
Marital deduction -------------------------- 250,000
Taxable estate ---------------------------- 450,000
Tax ------------------------------------ 110,500
Section 691(c) deduction: ($212,200- $110,500) $ 101,700
Total taxes (a).
Estate tax on husband's estate -------------- $ 126,500
Estate tax on wife's estate ------------------- 126,500
Income tax on $300,000 less $48,800 161,890
$ 414,890
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Total taxes (b):
Estate tax on husband's estate -------------- $ 212,200
Estate tax on wife's estate ------------------- 47,700
Income tax on $300,000 less $101,700 124,300
$ 384,200
The resultant savings to the family amount to $30,690. Such sav-
ing is due to the fact that the income tax<,rate is higher than the!-estate
tax rate. If the estate is large and section 691 income is small, or
where it is spread among a number of separate taxpayers, the result
would be quite different. This emphasizes the necessity for careful
planning where section 691 property is involved.
SUMMARY
This discussion of particular kinds of property and property rights
and the marital deduction highlights once more the increasingly difficult
task of the estate planner. If it is the draftsman's aim to obtain for his
client the maximum marital deduction allowable for estate tax purposes,
he must take the time to mquire in detail of his client regarding the kinds
of property which the client owns. A failure to obtain information about
foreign property or section 691 property can, as has been shown, prove
quite costly.
In drafting his client's will, the planner must be currently informed
on the legal incidence of certain types of property and the nature of rights
which the surviving spouse or others may have with respect to the estate
under applicable state law. The effect of state law is such that the client
should in all cases be warned that a change of domicile calls for a review
of the will. Lawyers are many times prone to regard the question of
domicile as having only to do with the validity of the execution of the
will; but, it has been shown that the substantive results are dramatically
different for such things as the widow's allowance and dower and home-
stead rights.
The draftsman must once again bend his talents toward accomplishing
what Congress intended in enacting the marital deduction, and which the
courts have once again thwarted. Good drafting can still accomplish the
desired result and avoid time consuming and costly arguments with the
Government. The interrelationship between state law property rights
and the marital deduction leaves no room for the careless lawyer.
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